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Abstract 9 
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Growing emphasis on finance as key to decarbonization requires social science research that critically attends 11 
to the emergent and diverse forms taken by carbon finance. First, we pluralize research into carbon finance, 12 
building on existing work to identify four main forms: carbon markets; ecosystem services; natural capital 13 
investment; and, capital allocated to low-carbon enterprises and projects. Second, we propose that research 14 
should problematize the processes through which carbon is variously translated into financial value. 15 
Illustrated with reference to low-carbon investment in electricity generation, our agenda thereby extends 16 
from the difficulties of producing carbon-as-commodity to the uncertainties of constituting carbon-as-asset. 17 
 18 
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Pluralizing and Problematizing Carbon Finance 21 
 22 
I  Introduction: from carbon markets to carbon finance  23 
 24 
The strategic significance of financial markets to climate change policy was confirmed at COP21 by the 25 
Paris Agreement of 2015 (Andresen et al., 2016). As stated in Article 2, the Paris Agreement entails a 26 
commitment to ‘making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and 27 
climate-resilient development’. Financial markets are positioned within climate change governance as key to 28 
unlocking action to prevent global warming in excess of 2 degrees Celsius by enabling investment in a low-29 
carbon transition at scale. It is estimated, for instance, that an additional $800 billion of investment in low-30 
carbon activities will be required each year in order to stay under this threshold (Campiglio, 2016; European 31 
Commission, 2018; McCollum et al., 2013; Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, 2016). However, 32 
current investment levels fall well short of what is calculated as necessary to meet global targets (Buchner et 33 
al., 2017; Campiglio, 2016), despite the unprecedented policies of cheap money pursued by the leading central 34 
banks in the wake of the global financial crisis and the recent expansion of financial markets that are variously 35 
termed ‘green’ (City of London Corporation, 2016), ‘sustainable’ (DB Climate Change Advisors, 2012), or 36 
‘environmental’ (Bertl, 2016). The growing emphasis on ‘finance flows’ as a means to decarbonization is 37 
significant, nonetheless. It not only marks a significant shift away from carbon trading and heralds a 38 
recognition of its limitations as a market-based strategy for low-carbon transition (Bryant, 2018; Ervine, 2014; 39 
Lane and Newell, 2016), but also requires a critical social science agenda capable of attending to the diverse 40 
forms of what we term ‘carbon finance’ that are now being mobilized towards this end. In this paper we seek 41 
to both pluralize the understanding of carbon finance within human geography and the social sciences, and to 42 
problematize the various processes through which carbon is translated into financial value.  43 
First, we seek to map out the terrain of multiple and relatively discrete forms of carbon finance that 44 
explicitly seek to act on carbon emissions alongside the extraction of financial value. We adopt the term carbon 45 
finance to expressly avoid confusion with the alternative rubric of ‘climate finance’ that conventionally and 46 
narrowly refers to donor funding or development aid consistent with the principles of the United Nations 47 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Ballesteros et al., 2010; Clapp et al., 2012; Godinot et 48 
al., 2017; World Bank, 2017). To delineate carbon finance, we draw into conversation literatures on the 49 
governing of climate change, the political and cultural economies of carbon markets, and wider bodies of 50 
research concerned with ‘neo-liberal natures’ (Bigger and Dempsey, 2018) and the ‘financialization of nature’ 51 
(Ouma et al., 2018). While it is indeed the case that, as Felli (2014: 252) observes, “the climate governance 52 
‘regime’ appears extraordinarily complex, specialised, even unfathomable”, this body of work enables us to 53 
identify the principal forms which carbon finance adopts as its strategic significance grows within that regime. 54 
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These include: markets that price and trade emissions rights (Callon, 2009; Knox-Hayes, 2016; McKenzie, 2009; 55 
Lovell, 2015) and ecosystem services (e.g. Asiyanbi, 2016; Corbera, 2012; Fletcher et al., 2016; Gupta et al., 56 
2012); forms of investment in natural capital designed to generate value through conservation and carbon 57 
sequestration (Dempsey, 2015; Fairhead et al., 2012; Kay, 2018; Sullivan, 2018); and, raising capital expressly 58 
for low-carbon investment in enterprises, projects and initiatives (Bracking, 2015; Christophers, 2016, 2018; 59 
Karpf and Mandel, 2018), especially to provide for the greening of urban infrastructures (Castree and 60 
Christophers, 2015; Knuth, 2018a) and the renewable and ‘clean tech’ energy sectors (Hall et al.,  2017; Knuth, 61 
2018b; McCarthy, 2015).  62 
Our second motivation in this paper is to problematize carbon finance in all of its different forms. In 63 
the context of contemporary climate change governance, problematizing carbon finance is essential if we are 64 
to move beyond narrow questions about the scale of finance flows that - animated by assertions of a ‘carbon 65 
finance gap’ between the size of the decarbonization challenge and the current levels of finance being directed 66 
towards it - tend to preoccupy policymakers. In the first instance, ‘problematization’ is a methodological 67 
approach (Foucault, 2003). It directs our attention to consider how the problem of climate change is itself 68 
rendered governable in such a way that carbon finance appears capable of providing for solutions and securing 69 
the future of life (Langley, 2019). As Sullivan (2018) has shown for investment in biodiversity and ecosystem 70 
services, for example, the method of problematization lends itself to the grounded investigation of the 71 
conditions of possibility and practicalities of carbon finance. Such a method is also broadly consistent with 72 
wider calls for a more pragmatic research orientation to the financialization of nature (Castree and 73 
Christophers, 2015; Ouma et al., 2018), particularly one that suspends theoretically-driven judgements on the 74 
systemic contribution of capital switching via the financial markets for addressing the ‘second contradiction of 75 
capitalism’ and providing a purported ‘socio-ecological fix’ (Ekers and Prudham, 2015; see Harvey 1978, 1982). 76 
Notwithstanding that carbon finance is conducted on the basis of the maximization of (albeit more 77 
sustainable) capitalist growth, problematization is a method that questions the privileged role of carbon 78 
finance in meeting the challenges of climate change and which pragmatically centres on the relational 79 
processes, contingencies and limits of the various and discrete forms taken by carbon finance. 80 
Our agenda for problematizing carbon finance is thus also an intervention in theoretical and 81 
conceptual debates that are present across the literatures we bring into conversation here. We will develop 82 
two related lines of argument that cut across the political economy and cultural economy approaches which 83 
dominate the literature. First, the critical analysis of carbon finance as a broad research terrain requires 84 
specific attention to the variegated processes through which carbon is incorporated into the extraction of 85 
financial value. Considerable work is necessary for carbon - as a material and discursive quality (e.g. high vs. 86 
low-carbon) - to be translated into financial value. We take seriously, then, recent arguments which stress that 87 
even though the abstraction of value from its material forms is a necessary part of the financialization of 88 
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nature, “it is vital that we do not portray the environment as a flat terrain over which financial investment can 89 
be unproblematically stretched” (Kay 2018: 172; see also Asiyanbi, 2017). The materiality and spatiality of 90 
carbon matter to the ways in which carbon finance is made, and to the political economies it enables. While 91 
we draw on a broader literature concerning the financialization of nature that stresses the “frictional 92 
encounters of finance and nature” (Ouma et al., 2018: 501), we focus specifically on the frictions that arise 93 
from carbon’s particular social, political, spatial and material qualities. 94 
Second, no single category can adequately conceptualize the contingent processes through which 95 
carbon is translated into financial value across carbon finance’s multiple forms. Although it is now widely 96 
questioned by political economists who have recently settled on the category of ‘rent’ for analysing the 97 
extraction of financial value from nature (Andreucci et al., 2017; Felli, 2014), we find commodification provides 98 
for an effective conceptualization of processes of carbon finance that feature speculative trading, especially 99 
when rights to emit carbon are priced and exchanged on carbon markets. However, speculation on carbon is 100 
but one mode of financialized accumulation on nature (Bryant, 2018; Ouma et al., 2018). Recent research into 101 
investment in natural capital and low-carbon technologies and infrastructures – some of which explicitly 102 
conceptualizes the extraction of financial value in these forms of carbon finance as ‘rent’, and some which 103 
does not - is pointing to the important ways in which carbon is figured as an ‘asset’ that can generate future 104 
revenues, and thereby act as collateral for the leverage of debt and creation of interest-bearing capital (Kay, 105 
2018; Knuth, 2018a, 2018b; Sullivan, 2018). Our conceptual contribution explicitly connects this research with 106 
an emerging body of work in cultural economy that, via the categories of ‘assetization’ and ‘capitalization’, 107 
furthers critical analysis of economization processes that leverage debt for capital investment (Birch, 2017a, 108 
2017b; Muniesa, 2017; Muniesa et al., 2017; Ouma, 2016, 2018). Assetization is the process of turning all 109 
manner of things into “capitalized property” that generates an income stream and entails liabilities and 110 
obligations (Birch, 2017a: 468, original emphasis). It is thus inseparable from capitalization as “a technique for 111 
prospective valuation” (Muniesa et al., 2017: 12), wherein, from the perspective of the investor, “financial 112 
value amounts to a future return anticipated through a calculation of the cost of capital rather than to a ‘price’ 113 
given to the asset on the market” (Muniesa 2017: 449). We seek to contribute, then, to calls for further 114 
research into how nature comes to be regarded as an investable proposition (Ouma et al., 2018), but suggest 115 
more rigorous understanding of these processes in carbon finance also requires insights from studies of 116 
assetization and capitalization in other domains. In sum, our agenda for the problematization of the processes 117 
of carbon finance in all of its forms extends from the relatively well-known difficulties of making carbon-as-118 
commodity to the presently under-researched impediments of producing carbon-as-asset.  119 
 The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section II reviews research on carbon-as-120 
commodity within human geography and allied fields. Section III turns to consider research that questions the 121 
relevance of commodification processes for critical understanding of the extraction of value across carbon 122 
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finance. We explain why we want to retain a concern with carbon-as-commodity whilst, at the same time, 123 
developing a conceptualization of carbon-as-asset through the cultural economy literature on assetization and 124 
capitalization. Section IV illustrates our agenda for pluralizing and problematizing carbon finance by focusing 125 
on a key form of carbon finance – raising capital for low-carbon investment – that has received comparatively 126 
little attention to date. Our specific focus is on low-carbon investment in electricity generation, and we draw 127 
critically on applied and policy research to tease out some of the difficulties of rendering carbon-as-asset in 128 
this domain of carbon finance. Section V offers concluding reflections on how an agenda that pluralizes and 129 
problematizes carbon finance can be taken forward in human geography and related fields.  130 
 131 
II  Commodifying Carbon  132 
 133 
Carbon markets price and trade two kinds of carbon credits: allowances, which are permits for 134 
regulated organizations to emit carbon dioxide; and offsets, transferrable credits that result from reduced 135 
emissions. That legally defined rights to emit carbon could be made to hold value in markets was initially 136 
recognised during the 1990s, leading to the suite of economic instruments that accompanied the 1997 Kyoto 137 
Protocol, including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and various voluntary offset schemes. 138 
Development of carbon markets continued apace with the formation of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 139 
(ETS) and various other regional carbon markets based on carbon allowances, including in Australia, China, 140 
Canada and the USA. Carbon markets are widely envisaged as a response to ‘negative externalities’ - i.e. the 141 
emissions that are produced but not owned by market actors. Producers are incentivised to not only reduce 142 
emissions, but also to ‘direct investment into lower-carbon technologies’ (Keohane, 2016: 27). As with all 143 
forms of market exchange, however, carbon markets rely on creating carbon as a commodity that can be 144 
priced and traded. Commodification, therefore, has been the primary focus for critical geographical and social 145 
scientific research over the past decades into the making of carbon markets.  146 
Research on carbon’s commodification has been shaped by two broad perspectives: political economy 147 
and cultural economy. Those working within the tradition of geographical political economy have approached 148 
carbon markets with an eye for the dynamics of commodification they set in train, informed by wider interests 149 
in the forms of appropriation (property) that underpin the creation of markets and  the growing role of  “nature 150 
as accumulation strategy” (Smith, 2006). Others highlight more directly how carbon’s commodification has 151 
created specific opportunities for finance capital, and the constellation of financial actors associated with the 152 
promotion, implementation and monitoring of carbon markets. Janelle Knox-Hayes (2016), for example, 153 
skilfully shows how the market infrastructures that produce carbon-as-commodity divorce the use value of 154 
resources from the exchange value of financial instruments, unleashing a financialized form of accumulation 155 
centred on speculation around fluctuating prices (see also Bigger, 2016; Knuth, 2015). A related line of political 156 
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economy inquiry examines how markets for carbon and ecosystem services enable accumulation, but at the 157 
expense of landscapes and communities drawn into the production of carbon offsets or reliant on such 158 
ecosystem services for their livelihoods and survival (Bachram, 2004; Bumpus and Liverman, 2011; Fairhead 159 
et al., 2012; Paterson, 2010). Bumpus and Liverman (2008), for example, argue that offset schemes rely on 160 
existing patterns of uneven development to find ‘efficient’ forms of carbon reduction, enabling  a process of  161 
“accumulation by decarbonization” in the global North through production of carbon credits in the global 162 
South.  163 
Research on the commodification of carbon from a cultural economy perspective has also addressed 164 
carbon markets and markets for biodiversity and ecosystems services. It points to the development of 165 
elaborate apparatus through which carbon is either made into a unit commensurate with both other sources 166 
of (reduced) emissions and with monetary worth, or which enable the capacities and qualities of a range of 167 
entities (from forests to houses) to forego (future) carbon emissions to hold value. This suggests that processes 168 
of carbon-as-commodity take multiple forms around which different kinds of economy are assembled, 169 
allowing for (and excluding) different kinds of socio-material relations and their outcomes. Here the seeming 170 
intangibility of carbon has led to a focus on the performative socio-technical processes through which carbon 171 
is commodified (Callon, 2009; McKenzie 2009). Because “carbon is a new and unusual commodity”, cultural 172 
economy thus emphasizes how “credible systems of measurement and calculation are especially important” 173 
to the development of carbon finance (Lovell, 2015: 127; see also Asiyanbi, 2017). The stabilization of carbon-174 
as-commodity requires significant work, as Lovell (2015: 127) explores in the context of the forest carbon 175 
market where marketization “has been, to date, almost entirely centred on debates about the measurement, 176 
reporting and verification of the carbon stored in forests”.  177 
The complex processes of carbon-as-commodity are tied up with the nature of carbon itself. Rather 178 
than being a commodity in the strictest sense of being a good that can be bought or sold, the trading of carbon 179 
is more like the buying and selling of services – where the service is the calculated and qualified ability to 180 
contribute to reducing atmospheric carbon. The development of markets around the potential of forests and 181 
land cover to sequester carbon from the atmosphere has attracted sustained critical attention, particularly 182 
the rapid development of so-called Reduced Emissions from Degradation & Deforestation schemes (REDD, or 183 
REDD+ where additional sustainability benefits are involved) (Asiyanbi, 2016; Corbera, 2012; Fletcher et al., 184 
2016; Gupta et al., 2012). As one of a number of processes that have expanded through the development of 185 
the concept of ecosystem services and its circulation in global environmental governance, REDD schemes may 186 
well be an example of “accumulation by conservation” (Büscher and Fletcher, 2015). Work in cultural 187 
economy, however, reveals the complex set of calculations and translations required for forests (and other 188 
ecosystems) to generate financial returns from for the ‘services’ they provide.  189 
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Reading across the political economy and cultural economy literatures that foreground the processes 190 
of carbon-as-commodity in carbon markets and ecosystem services, we can highlight two insights that are 191 
particularly relevant for problematizing the processes of carbon finance. First, research has shown how 192 
commodification is a precarious achievement, “a process of ontological reconfiguration through which 193 
different qualities of nature and resource-based production are translated into a financial value form to be 194 
traded in specialized markets” (Ouma et al., 2018: 2). The key point here is that value is neither latent in 195 
material things (an inherent property, awaiting capture) nor a product of discursive claims (a projection onto 196 
the world), but an achievement that entails bringing materialities, relations and discourses into alignment. 197 
Through the production and maintenance of these alignments, carbon can be made to bear value as a 198 
commodity that can be priced, traded and speculated upon. In turn, the performativity of markets should not  199 
be read (only) as an abstract set of techniques or forms of calculation by which carbon comes to be made 200 
valuable and fungible, but also as “practices that are imbued with a materiality … [such that they] become 201 
material interventions into how economic action unfolds” (Lansing, 2012: 207).  202 
Second, research into the peculiar ‘immateriality’ of carbon-as-commodity highlights processes of 203 
abstraction and “matters of measure” that are “used…to define adequate bearers of value” (Robertson, 2012: 204 
388). Early work on markets in ecosystem services commented frequently on their strangely ‘immaterial’ 205 
character - i.e. how value is expanded not by the circulation of carbon per se, but by the exchange of a qualified 206 
abstraction acting as a proxy for an environmental service. However, as Robertson (2012) points out, markets 207 
in ecosystem services only look peculiar because we are accustomed to value circulating in the form of physical 208 
commodities (such as copper, coal or grain). Furthermore, he argues, the reason we see this as the normal 209 
way of things is that getting many classic materials (like coal) to bear value requires their physical 210 
displacement. Or, to put it another way, capital has been unable to figure out a way to commodify coal without 211 
its physical extraction and circulation. Ecosystem services, on the other hand, can be made to bear value in 212 
ways that do not require physical circulation of the underpinning materials: markets for ecosystem services 213 
rest on “the creation of a set of general abstractions adequate to allow nature to circulate – not just as 214 
commodified bits of material, but as financial and service commodities” (Robertson, 2012: 388). By taking 215 
seriously the “process of creating socially-necessary abstractions that are adequate to bear value in capitalist 216 
circulation”, Robertson (2012: 386) opens up for discussion the different forms in which carbon can be made 217 
to bear value, the techniques of classification and categorization through which this occurs, and the “the work 218 
(that) must be done to convince observers that these simpliﬁcations are adequate to the task of 219 
representation” (ibid., 396). At the same time, recent research demonstrates that while such processes of 220 
abstraction are essential and often centre on the making of nature as ‘natural capital’ (Sullivan, 2018), they 221 
are also shaped by the spatiality and materiality of the commodities/services themselves. In her account of 222 
the development of conservation finance in the US, for example, Kay (2018) shows how different practices of 223 
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abstraction, qualification and circulation were developed in relation to rangelands and woodlands, creating 224 
different vehicles for investment and for capital accumulation.  225 
 226 
III  From carbon-as-commodity to carbon-as-asset  227 
 228 
We find commodification provides an effective conceptualization of processes of carbon finance that 229 
feature speculative trading on prices, even though achievements of carbon-as-commodity tend to be 230 
experimental and incomplete. Yet whether carbon markets are indeed a matter of commodification is moot 231 
(Bigger and Demspey, 2018). Felli (2014) argues, instead, that emission allowances and carbon offsets are a 232 
kind of ‘climate rent’. His Marxian analysis hinges on the distinction between accumulation via commodity 233 
production (i.e. creation of value through expanded reproduction) and accumulation via the appropriation of 234 
value produced elsewhere (or what Harvey (2003) terms “accumulation by dispossession”). Felli (2014: 271) 235 
observes that the right to emit greenhouse gases has “legally become a necessary condition of production”, 236 
“both a limitation and a right of access” for capitalist commodity production. As a consequence, “the 237 
distribution and circulation of (carbon allowances) through market-based mechanisms” should not be 238 
understood as speculative accumulation on carbon-as-commodity, “but rather as a form of rent” (2014: 254). 239 
Felli’s intervention has stimulated a growing body of work on financialization and nature that foregrounds “the 240 
circulation of money and profit through non-productive forms of value appropriation” via the conceptual 241 
category of ‘rent’ (Andreucci et al., 2017: 28; see also Kay, 2018, Kay and Kenney-Lazar, 2017; Knuth, 2015).  242 
We read Felli’s (2014) objections to the efficacy of the concept of commodification as productive for 243 
the problematization of carbon finance in three main ways. First, Felli (2014) reminds researchers that the 244 
critical analysis of carbon finance needs to recognise the significance of acts of sovereign power, an argument 245 
that is consistent with wider calls for analyses of the financialization of nature to engage with “the multiple 246 
roles of the state in mediating the circulation of finance in and through nature” (Ouma et al., 2018: 500). Felli’s 247 
(2014: 251) starting point is that rights to emit greenhouse gases created through international law are actually 248 
“a form of public property” rather than commodities, such that the unequal distribution of these legally 249 
defined rights amongst states “amounts to the distribution of rights to climate rent”. More than simply 250 
affirming the systemic role of the capitalist state in securing the conditions for expanded reproduction (Felli, 251 
2014: 255-6), Felli highlights how specific juridical techniques and regulatory provisions are necessary 252 
(alongside socio-technical achievements and abstractions) for carbon to be translated into financial value.  253 
Second, Felli’s (2014) novel account of the carbon market encourages us to specify more precisely 254 
what the concept of commodification brings to critical analysis of carbon finance. Here we underscore how 255 
commodification centres attention on the extraction of value through speculative trading on the price of things 256 
that have been made exchangeable. Rights to emit carbon may be analogous to land as property and have no 257 
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value in strict Marxist terms, as Felli argues, but they nonetheless do have a use- and exchange-value. In other 258 
words, Felli’s analysis does not foreclose the critical purchase of commodification for understanding 259 
speculative trading within carbon markets.  In Kay’s (2018) detailed study of the emergence of conservation 260 
finance in the US, for example, such schemes are shown to feature arbitrage pricing that depends upon existing 261 
markets for land and other physical commodities.  Precisely because it centres attention on speculation, the 262 
concept of commodification is similarly important to Bryant’s (2018) nuanced analysis of the development of 263 
the EU ETS. He is clear that, notwithstanding the processes of carbon-as-commodity, “to date, carbon has 264 
become capital only occasionally rather than systemically” due to the political conditions of its making and its 265 
persistent low market worth (ibid., 615). Carbon markets are therefore not witnessing the leveraging of debt 266 
against carbon (i.e. they have not enabled interest-bearing capitalization). In practice, the logics and 267 
mechanisms of carbon commodification have developed in ways that allow for only the restricted and 268 
speculative extraction of financial value.  269 
Third, we regard Felli’s (2014) contribution to be productive for the problematization of carbon finance 270 
because it highlights the need to go beyond the category of commodification for understanding processes of 271 
carbon finance. His analysis points to how other political economies – in this case, of rent extraction and 272 
circulation – are constituted, at least in part, through the translation of carbon into financial value. It is clear 273 
for Felli (2014) that these processes rest primarily on the making of property relations. However, it is 274 
significant, we suggest, that others developing Felli’s (2014) analysis tend to slide from his concern with 275 
property rights and “pseudo-commodities” into a concern with ‘assets’, a category that Felli does not use in 276 
his essay. For Andreucci et al. (2017: 33), for example, accumulation by dispossession and rent-seeking include 277 
processes that create “Pseudo-commodities … as socio-ecological assets that can be incorporated within 278 
private property regimes, such as carbon credits, patents on genetic material, ecosystem services, and so on.” 279 
Recent research into investment in natural capital and low-carbon technologies and infrastructures – some of 280 
which explicitly conceptualizes the extraction of financial value in these forms of carbon finance as ‘rent’, and 281 
some which does not - is also pointing to the important ways in which carbon is figured as an ‘asset’ (Kay, 282 
2018; Knuth, 2018a, 2018b; Sullivan, 2018). This work recognises the creation of assets that can generate 283 
future revenues as crucial to the extraction of financial value, not least because assets simultaneously act as 284 
collateral for the leverage of debt and creation of interest-bearing capital. Sullivan (2018: 56), for example, 285 
explores how framing nature as ‘natural-capital’ has led it to being considered more or less literally as “a bank 286 
of financial assets … [or] ‘countable capital’”. In this sense, nature (and carbon more specifically) come to be 287 
regarded as ‘financial’ when they attract financial investment, that is, when they become ‘assets’. 288 
To advance this analytical turn towards processes of asset-making taking place across different forms 289 
of carbon finance, we suggest that it is productive to connect with emerging cultural economy research that 290 
explicitly articulates the categories of ‘assetization’ and ‘capitalization’ (Birch, 2017a, 2017b; Muniesa, 2017; 291 
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Muniesa et al., 2017). Others are also beginning to forge this connection in relation to the financialization of 292 
nature, broadly understood (Ouma, 2016, 2018). For Ouma et al. (2018: 501), then, nature’s financialization is 293 
“linked to the more general assetization of almost everything” (see Leyshon and Thrift, 2007). For us, however, 294 
the key point from this emergent cultural economy work is that the contingent processes that turn carbon into 295 
assets are quite different to the making of carbon-as-commodity. This is because, in contrast with 296 
commodities, assets are always already “capitalized property” (Birch, 2017a: 468, original emphasis); that is, 297 
they leverage debt against an expected income stream and necessarily entail liabilities, repayments and other 298 
obligations to investors.  299 
To be regarded as an investable proposition in the first instance, an asset is deemed to be capable of 300 
bearing financial value not primarily because of its potential use- or exchange-value (although it might 301 
subsequently be commodified and speculated upon as a transferable ownership claim). The process of 302 
‘becoming asset’ is primarily a matter of the potential to generate future returns on capital (Muniesa et al., 303 
2017: 128-131), regardless of whether the assets in question are capitalized through the issuance of loans, 304 
debt instruments or other securities. Indeed, such is the difference between the valuation processes of 305 
commodification and assetization that, for Muniesa and his colleagues (2017), the separate category of 306 
‘capitalization’ is used to refer to the processes of prospective valuation – both by and for investors - that are 307 
integral to assetization. It is the streams of repayments and other obligations inherent to financial assets 308 
which, strictly speaking, ensure they are not property relations as such, but are actually investor claims on 309 
credit-debt relations. Contrary to Andreucci et al. (2017), we thus find that the analogy that Felli (2014: 268) 310 
draws between property relations for land and rights to emit carbon is not easily generalizable to the relational 311 
processes of carbon finance and the financialization of nature. While each enable rentiership broadly 312 
understood as the extraction of value by owners of resources (Birch 2017b), contingent assetization processes 313 
are nonetheless not the same as making things into property rights. 314 
In sum, the extraction of financial value across the various forms of carbon finance certainly features 315 
secondary trading and speculation on prices, and focusing on the contingent processes of carbon-as-316 
commodity is crucial to the problematization of carbon finance in this respect. However, this should not 317 
obscure significant differences between capital and (pseudo-)commodity marketizations, regardless of how 318 
‘immaterial’ and speculative the commodity markets in question might be. The problematization of carbon 319 
finance therefore also needs to be attuned to the production of carbon as an ‘asset class’ (see Kay, 2018), 320 
foregrounding the exigencies of assetization and capitalization processes and the difficulties of rendering 321 
carbon-as-asset. Crucial to the juridical and socio-technical achievements and abstractions that stabilize 322 
carbon-as-asset, we argue, is capitalization: that is, how a specific carbon sequestration initiative or low-323 
carbon investment is deemed valuable and able to realize returns because it is capable of bearing debt.  324 
 325 
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IV  Making carbon-as-asset: investment in low-carbon electricity generation    326 
 327 
In this section of the paper, we concentrate on an important form of carbon finance that - compared 328 
to carbon markets, payments for ecosystem services and investment in natural capital - has received relatively 329 
little attention in human geography and social science research: the raising of capital for low-carbon 330 
investments in enterprises and projects (cf. Bracking, 2015; Christophers, 2016, 2018; Karpf and Mandel, 2018; 331 
Tripathy, 2017). Our aim is to illustrate our agenda for problematizing carbon finance, especially as it mobilizes 332 
the insights from the literature we developed above and pertains to the processes of carbon-as-asset that are 333 
at the heart of low-carbon investment. Specifically, we focus on low-carbon investment in the renewable 334 
energy sector and, in the interests of brevity, we concentrate on the USA and UK where energy provision is 335 
largely already privatized and marketized. The energy sector’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions 336 
has made it a logical first target of public and private initiatives aimed at a low-carbon transition. As revealed 337 
by existing critical research (e.g. Eadson and Foden, 2018; Mazzucato and Semieniuk 2018; McCarthy, 2015; 338 
Webb and Hawkey, 2017), decarbonization efforts in the energy sector tend to target electrical power 339 
generation, given the prevalence of large point-source emissions (e.g. coal-fired power stations), concentrated 340 
patterns of ownership (e.g. utility companies), and opportunities for shifting investment towards renewable 341 
energy sources. Conventional narratives around energy and climate change governance also identify a ‘finance 342 
gap’ in this domain, and highlight the challenges of turning low-carbon forms of energy into investible 343 
propositions (Hall et al., 2017; Webb and Hawkey, 2017). 344 
Low-carbon investment in the power sector is a process of assetization that turns, first, on classifying 345 
and categorizing the carbon qualities (low/high) of different forms of electricity generation by reference to 346 
regulatory, market or other governance criteria; and, second, on assembling assets that qualify against these 347 
criteria – i.e. forms of capitalized property which yield an income stream, and which are sufficient to bear 348 
debt. The first dimension ensures the low-carbon qualities of the investment are a crucial consideration, but 349 
certainly does not guarantee they will figure in the related valuations and associated calculations about the 350 
cost of capital. Put another way, low-carbon investments in renewable electricity generation are not 351 
collateralized against future low-carbon impacts in ways that would parallel social impact bonds and 352 
environmental impact bonds (which only make payments to investors when measureable targets for the 353 
impact performance of the capitalized projects in question are met (Christophers, 2018; Langley, 2018a).  354 
A broad body of applied and policy work in this domain speaks to the processes through which low-355 
carbon assets are constituted in the power sector. This research leads us to make four general points about 356 
the production of carbon-as-asset that are especially relevant to our research agenda for problematizing 357 
carbon finance. First, assetization processes in low-carbon electricity generation do not take a singular 358 
financial and organizational form: low-carbon ‘becomes asset’ via several financial mechanisms and 359 
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organizational structures. A range of structured debt, bond issues and equity models have also emerged, 360 
bringing lower costs of capital to the renewable energy sector (EWEA, 2018). We interpret this profusion of 361 
financial and organizational structures as experimentation with alternative assetization processes for 362 
unlocking income streams and attracting investors to the sector. Capital market creation is an incomplete and 363 
adaptive process in the renewable energy sector (Hall et al., 2017), with new actors and organizational 364 
structures emerging over time in response to policy shifts (e.g. in relation to energy price support and taxation) 365 
and broader developments in capital markets. That said, experimentation in the US and UK has largely centred 366 
on two models of assetization to date. 367 
In the more widely used project finance model, assetization occurs at the level of a specific project 368 
(e.g. a wind farm or solar park): project developers establish a special purpose vehicle (a legal entity to 369 
undertake the project) and debt is raised against future sales of electricity from the project. Thus, the 370 
capitalization of low-carbon investment in the electricity generation sector is not simply “a dual process of 371 
valuation” (Muniesa, 2012: 31) that centres on the current and future economic prospects of the corporations 372 
and institutions involved. This is because project finance is provided on a limited or non-recourse basis – i.e. 373 
investors’ claims as creditors are restricted to the assets and income streams of the new project, and do not 374 
extend to the wider assets and cash flows of the consortium of companies that own and operate the project 375 
(Finnerty, 2013; Langley, 2018b). In this way, project financing of a low-carbon asset works “like a giant 376 
mortgage” as the only security for the loan is the project itself (EWEA, 2018). The project model brings together 377 
a consortium of actors (project developer, operator, contractors) with debt finance typically provided by a 378 
bank. Since the global financial crisis, however, bank lending to renewable energy projects has sharply reduced 379 
and key lending terms (such as the loan period) have tightened. In its place, securitization and other alternative 380 
techniques of project finance have emerged and, with this, institutional investors, sovereign wealth funds and 381 
others that comprise the so-called ‘shadow banking’ sector have come to play a growing role. Miller et al. 382 
(2018) highlight the diverse sources of capital currently associated with low-carbon assets in North American 383 
renewable energy, including  project financing via public market capital (asset-backed securities and various 384 
debt products), hybrid bond financing, and even crowdfunding. Hybrid bonds are raised against a portfolio of 385 
renewable energy projects with a common owner rather than an individual project, and address key challenges 386 
(of space and time) associated with financing renewable energy projects. A portfolio of projects – 387 
geographically distributed and utilizing different technical designs - reduces risks to revenue associated with 388 
localised weather conditions (around wind and solar power), simultaneous design faults and, if the projects 389 
are in different jurisdictions, regulatory risks (EWEA, 2018). More generally, hybrid bonds can “expand the 390 
pool of available candidates” who can finance new projects: in the US context, for example, where production 391 
tax credits are a key driver of investment in renewables (see below), these bonds reach investors beyond those 392 
with heavy tax obligations (Tang et al., 2012: 693). Crowdfunding – such as through the Abundance generation 393 
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platform in the UK – is a further example of assetization processes of project finance in low-carbon energy, 394 
although currently limited to early-stage start-ups where high risks and the lack of collateral mean project 395 
developers cannot “assemble debt finance from banks or venture capitalists easily” (Lam and Law, 2016: 12; 396 
Vasileiadou et al., 2016).  397 
The project finance model contrasts with green bonds that, despite funding a specified project or 398 
initiative, are assets that are issued against the issuer’s full balance sheet and earnings potential rather than 399 
against the specific credentials and returns of the decarbonizing project(s) to be funded. In the renewable 400 
energy sector in the US and UK, green bonds are one of the ways in which on-balance sheet funding is raised 401 
(via corporate debt, or internal cash flow management for small projects), especially where larger companies, 402 
such as utilities, have entered into renewables (Coughlin, 2012; EWEA, 2018; Hall et al., 2017). As a range of 403 
geographic research into the emergence and development of green bonds reveals (Bracking, 2015; 404 
Christophers, 2016, 2018; Clapp et al., 2015; Karpf and Mandel, 2018; Tripathy, 2017), these assetization 405 
processes are also a feature, more broadly, of low-carbon investment as a form of carbon finance. Over the 406 
space of a decade, green bonds as an example of so-called ‘labelled debt’ have “become a mainstream 407 
financial instrument” (Karpf and Mandel, 2018: 161), and ostensible “successor” to the CDM in the governance 408 
of climate change (Bracking, 2015: 2338). Globally, these fixed-income instruments are variously issued by 409 
corporations, banks, multilateral institutions, sovereign states and municipalities to fund specified projects 410 
and initiatives. In aggregate, they are roughly distributed between the renewable energy sector (~40 percent), 411 
retrofitting buildings and improving energy efficiency in industrial plant and processes (~20 percent), and new 412 
and renewed transport infrastructures (~15 percent) (author calculations, based on data from Climate Bonds 413 
Initiative, 2017). 414 
A second key point emerging from the applied and policy literature attests to the work involved in 415 
assembling low-carbon-as-asset – i.e. as an abstraction and organizational form sufficient to bear debt – and 416 
how traditional sources of energy finance have found low-carbon challenging. Investors conventionally 417 
perceived low-carbon projects as illiquid and relatively high risk, involving relatively immature technologies 418 
across a limited number of sites. That green bonds are issued against the issuer’s full balance sheet and 419 
earnings potential has, for example, been crucial to their appeal to risk-adverse investors in renewable energy 420 
projects (Christophers, 2016). More specifically, adapting energy finance to the material qualities of 421 
renewables has challenged processes of assetization: the intermittent and weather-dependent character of 422 
wind and solar power generation, for example, accentuates commercial risks for developers (Tang et al. 2012; 423 
Lam and Law, 2016; Miller et al., 2018). Owners and developers of low-carbon assets have created financing 424 
structures that attempts to work around the material challenges of renewables. This includes, for example, 425 
modifying the project finance model associated with conventional infrastructure and resource projects, where 426 
income streams are relatively predictable and pension funds and institutional investors have been ready to 427 
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enter into project finance. This widely-used model has been tailored for financing renewables, where revenues 428 
are subject to the stochastic variability of physical environmental systems, through a combination of 429 
organizational, calculative and regulatory adaptations.  430 
Initially, banks provided an organizational fix that enabled project finance to take hold in the 431 
renewable energy sector, drawing on their capacity to issue long-term debt and negotiate key assumptions of 432 
the loan agreement to translate technical assessments of energy generation into expected revenues and 433 
repayment schedules. Further adaptations to the distinctive material qualities of renewables were necessary 434 
to draw non-bank actors into low-carbon project finance. On the calculative side, growing availability of 435 
operational data from projects has enabled more accurate projections of electricity production, and the use 436 
of increasingly robust algorithms for converting local weather and climate data into calculations of revenue; 437 
and in terms of regulation, price support mechanisms have evolved to bring more security to revenues. The 438 
UK government, for example, has sought – with some difficulty – to implement an approach to energy policy 439 
(and infrastructure more generally) that gives capital markets a central role (see Langley, 2018b). To further 440 
this objective in relation to low-carbon energy sector specifically, it has recently replaced a renewables 441 
incentive scheme, based on tradeable green certificates (Renewable Obligations Certificate), with a Feed in 442 
Tariff structure (via Contracts for Difference). The significance of the latter, as Hall et al. (2017: 291) explain, 443 
is that it “socialise(s) price risks by guaranteeing the subsidy support price (and)…. eliminates both the risks of 444 
the support mechanism price being defined by a relative scarcity of tradable certificates, and wholesale price 445 
risk.”  446 
This leads us to the third issue about the processes of carbon-as-asset that is, in effect, highlighted by 447 
the applied and policy literature on the financing of renewable energy: the growing involvement of 448 
mainstream investors in this discrete form of carbon finance has driven significant shifts in how assetization 449 
occurs (Hall et al., 2017). Rather than assembling a low-carbon asset sufficient to bear bank debt – 450 
characterised by long loan terms and specialist in-house/boutique knowledge - low-carbon electricity 451 
generation is increasingly assembled to perform as an ‘asset class’. The renewable energy sector is certainly 452 
not alone in this respect, as the drive for the so-called ‘mainstreaming’ of low-carbon investment is producing 453 
similar pressures to standardize assets across the broader market for green bonds, for example (G20 Finance 454 
Study Group, 2016). The consequences of this shift in the renewable energy sector extend beyond 455 
diversification of the organizational forms and devices associated with ‘becoming asset’ discussed above to 456 
the ecologies of finance created around low-carbon energy. Specifically, it extends to how assetization and 457 
capitalization may “affect the direction of the evolution of renewable energy” by differentially empowering 458 
some financial actors over others (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018: 11). Researchers have found significant 459 
differences in risk appetite among investors in low-carbon projects with private actors favouring “low risk 460 
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much more than public ones”, highlighting the importance of understanding the consequences of privileging 461 
carbon finance as a mode of climate change governance (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2018: 18).  462 
The fourth general finding we derive from the applied and policy literatures is that, as a consequence 463 
of the challenges of enacting this form of carbon finance in the renewable electricity generation sector, 464 
processes of becoming asset and capitalization feature various kinds of state interventions and public support. 465 
State support has played a very significant role in creating carbon-as-asset in relation to the energy sector, 466 
notwithstanding the way private finance in energy initially emerged via de-regulatory initiatives, limits on 467 
public sector borrowing, and the introduction of price-based competition in sectors like gas and electricity 468 
(Jensen and Dowlatabadi, 2017; Knuth, 2017). Particularly important have been a raft of public policy 469 
initiatives that includes tax credits, price support mechanisms (e.g. feed-in-tariffs) and renewable obligations 470 
(Tang et al., 2012: 693). This is illustrated, for example, by the wide-ranging mandate of the UK Government’s 471 
Green Investment Bank. Tax legislation is very significant in the United States, where the Production Tax Credit 472 
available for renewable power is a key influence on techniques of project finance for utility-scale renewables 473 
projects (Bolinger et al, 2009; Bolinger, 2011; Regante, 2012; Vasileiadou et al., 2016). More fundamentally, 474 
the making of low-carbon assets rests directly on differentiations and qualifications around carbon initiated 475 
and sanctioned by the state (Bridge, 2017). These include, for example, government rulings on the 476 
technological form and scale of electricity generation qualifying for price support or tax credits; the systems 477 
of green certification around low-carbon generation it either directly supports or rules admissible in law; and 478 
enabling acts of legislation that mandate action on decarbonization, differentiate low-carbon and renewables 479 
from other forms of generation and, as in the case of the UK Climate Change Act, set carbon budgets and 480 
legally-binding targets.   481 
  482 
V  Conclusions  483 
 484 
The landscape of climate change governance has shifted since human geographers first critically 485 
engaged with carbon finance. There is now growing realization of finance’s “profound potential to remake the 486 
arteries through which capital flows and that are the lifeblood of the biological and social reproduction of most 487 
of contemporary humanity” (Castree and Christophers, 2015: 385). This paper is an attempt to respond to 488 
these developments by critically reviewing state-of-the-art research within human geography and related 489 
fields in order to advance an agenda that both pluralizes and problematizes carbon finance.  490 
Drawing on the existing literature on carbon markets and ecosystem services, we identified key 491 
insights essential for problematizing the proliferating and multiple forms of carbon finance. The 492 
commodification of carbon is a precarious achievement inexorably tied to both the means through which it is 493 
achieved and to carbon’s materialities, and abstractions and calculations are central to ensuring carbon-as-494 
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commodity is able to bear value. From Felli’s (2014) significant intervention and a rapidly growing literature 495 
that subsequently rejects a focus on commodification in favour of the production of property relations that 496 
enable rent-seeking, we draw the importance for critical analysis of the significance of sovereign power, the 497 
specific utility of commodification as a concept for centring attention on the extraction of value through 498 
speculation, and how processes of carbon finance cannot be adequately understood as commodification. To 499 
open up for analysis the forms of carbon finance that, in particular, invest in nature and raise of capital for 500 
low-carbon investment, we have built on existing research that highlights how carbon is figured as an ‘asset’, 501 
connecting our research agenda with wider cultural economy work that articulates the categories of 502 
assetization and capitalization to analyse economization processes that leverage debt for capital investment. 503 
From these starting points, the paper has sought to extend the problematization of carbon finance in all its 504 
forms from the relatively well-known difficulties of making carbon-as-commodity to the presently under-505 
researched impediments of producing carbon-as-asset. Demonstrating the potential of such an approach, we 506 
turned to low-carbon investment in electricity generation, largely as it is taking place in the USA and UK. Here 507 
we highlighted how the processes of carbon-as-asset do not take a singular financial and organizational form, 508 
entail attempts to work around the material challenges of renewables, change as mainstream investors 509 
become involved, and feature various kinds of state interventions and public support.   510 
Rather than seeking to set out a singular agenda for work on carbon finance, we would hope that our 511 
paper will generate further research centred on the diverse, contingent and problematic ways in which carbon-512 
as-commodity and carbon-as-asset are constituted, and the consequences that this has for prospects of 513 
decarbonization. Although we have drawn attention to four main forms of carbon finance – markets for carbon 514 
allowances and offsets, ecosystem services, investment in natural capital for carbon sequestration, and the 515 
raising of capital for low-carbon investment – there are also several further forms of carbon finance that 516 
remain under-explored. For example, few studies have examined how carbon comes to be commodified 517 
beyond cap and trade carbon markets or offset schemes. Work on low-carbon housing and property markets 518 
is perhaps an exception, with research demonstrating how delivering carbon savings in this sector rests on the 519 
identification of metrics, monitoring, standardization and verification to attract investment (Edwards and 520 
Bulkeley, 2017; Lovell, 2004, 2015). Carbon savings of this kind do not function within traditional markets, but 521 
come to be commodified in quasi-markets that distribute and exchange forms of government subsidy or 522 
philanthropic donation. Often the assumption behind these forms of low-carbon qualification is that once their 523 
carbon value can be accounted for, markets will form around them. Yet so far there is limited evidence of the 524 
spontaneous formation of markets around these qualified commodities in relation to housing. Recent research 525 
suggests, however, that within certain urban markets for commercial property in the US, “many players are 526 
now working to convert green building into a resource for real estate developers, owners, and investors, and 527 
to harness those streams of green value added for new financial instruments and investment markets” (Knuth, 528 
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2015: 637). This shift is significant, in terms of our argument in the paper, as it indicates a move from away 529 
from a direct interest in the value of energy savings that can be derived from green buildings to “more 530 
speculative manoeuvring around the investment potential of green property” (Knuth, 2015: 637).  531 
Equally, we are wary that problematizing the processes of carbon-as-asset is not narrowed to the 532 
financing of the renewable energy sector. Rather, we would want to encourage research that might investigate 533 
why carbon finance can be secured in relation to some forms of carbon – for example to its absence in 534 
renewable electricity generation – rather than others, such as the carbon content of the retail sector or  535 
energy-intensive industries, such as steel, plastic or cement. Similarly, we would also want to guard against 536 
the assumption that, paralleling the attention given to carbon markets by research into carbon-as-commodity, 537 
the problematization of carbon-as-asset necessarily entails a focus on processes that are solely located in 538 
capital markets. Chinese banks, for instance, are the subject of incentives and guidance by the People’s Bank 539 
of China and other regulatory agencies designed to privilege loans in support of low-carbon entities and 540 
projects, and there is pressure for similar arrangements that reward the capitalization of low-carbon assets to 541 
be incorporated into the macroprudential regulation of banking elsewhere (Campiglio 2016). Banks are 542 
increasingly interested in the carbon credentials of the assets in their loan portfolios, not least because central 543 
banks are coming to regard climate change and the prospect of a sudden collapse in the valuations of carbon-544 
intensive economic entities as material to financial stability. The Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on 545 
Climate-Related Disclosures (2017) has, for instance, recently published a set of voluntary metrics and 546 
measures that seem likely to feature strongly in the processes by which banks calculate the ‘high carbon’ 547 
qualities of the brown assets on their balance sheets and thus the extent of their exposure to the so-called 548 
‘carbon bubble’. Climate change risk and the production of what we might term ‘high-carbon-as-asset’ is also 549 
presently at the heart of divestment campaigns in support of decarbonization by pension funds and other 550 
institutional investors, although it is noticeable that not all pension funds regard divestment as necessary or 551 
as the most appropriate response to climate change (Stausball, 2015). A pluralized research agenda for carbon 552 
finance that extends to problematizing the processes of carbon-as-asset can, therefore, be taken in new 553 
directions, where the pertinent questions centre on the ‘unbecoming’ of high-carbon assets and asset classes. 554 
What is clear, however, is that interrogating the relations between carbon’s material form, its abstraction, 555 
capitalization and political economy will be key if we are to understand the potential for carbon finance to act 556 
as the ‘game changer’ for climate futures it is presently heralded to be.  557 
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